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Barely a month ago, I had the distinct pleasure of commenting on another paper by Lori Marino 
and Kristin Allen entitled “The Psychology of Cows,” shortly to appear in Animal Behavior and 
Cognition. In my commentary, I pointed out how delighted I was to find a paper that is everything 
one could want in a discussion of animal mind. Not only was the paper scientifically up-to-date 
and exhaustive: it was solidly grounded in common sense and common decency and discussed 
forthrightly the ethical and animal welfare implications of the science recounted – something 
unfortunately quite rare in scientific papers on the subject. 
 In my 1989 book, The Unheeded Cry (Rollins 1989), I traced both conceptually and 
historically how, in the eyes (as it were) of the scientific community, “the animals lost their minds” 
as a legitimate object of study in science. Whereas Darwin had unequivocally taken it for granted 
that if morphological and physiological traits in animals were phylogenetically continuous with 
those of humans, so too were psychological and mental traits, the subsequent unfortunate 
ascendance of behaviorism and positivism ended this biological ecumenism. By the mid-20th 
century, one could find virtually no psychologists or ethologists who were willing, in their scientific 
moments, to speak of animal subjective experiences (Rollin & Rollin 2014). It was not until 2012 
that the scientific community in a consensus conference recognized that animals have thoughts 
and feelings (Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness, Low et al. 2012)! 
 The classic volume, Instinctive Behavior, edited by Claire Schiller (1957), chronicles the first 
interactions of Anglo-American behaviorists with European ethologists of the school of Lorenz 
and Tinbergen. Though the two schools agreed about little else, they were of one mind in denying 
consciousness or its knowability in animals. And since an additional ideological component of 
established science denies the relevance of ethics to science, there was no moral pressure to 
advance discussions of animal mind. 
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 Not only did ignoring consciousness lead to moral outrages, such as the failure to utilize 
analgesia for animals deployed in painful experiments until US federal law passed in 1985 
mandated such control of pain and distress, it also led to logical absurdities. To cite two examples, 
the same research community that denied the reality of animal pain tested all human analgesics 
on animals (Rollin 1989). Second, although the psychiatric and psychological communities also 
denied animal mind, when funding became available to do so they were perfectly willing to 
develop animal models of mental illness, despite the fact that these diseases have inescapable 
subjective psychological dimensions (Rollin & Rollin 2014). 
 In George Orwell’s classic work, Animal Farm, one finds the statement “all animals are 
equal, but some animals are more equal than others.” This prescient remark also captures the 
prevailing view about animal welfare as social concern for animals gradually began to grow across 
the past 40 or 50 years. The first piece of federal legislation showing concern for animals was the 
Animal Welfare Act, passed in 1966. This law was really directed at allaying the fear of pet owners 
that their animals would be kidnapped and sold to research laboratories. (This fear was far from 
groundless. One of my friends, a veterinary school Dean, showed me a photograph of a sign 
posted in the neighborhood of Harvard enjoining boys to bring dogs to the Harvard Medical 
School at a certain time, “no questions asked.”) More important for our discussion is the fact that 
the vast majority of animals used for research – over 90% – were totally excluded from the Animal 
Welfare Act. These excluded animals included, among others, rats and mice and birds, including 
chickens. 
 The same tendency to favor certain species and ignore others is manifest In the 1957 
Humane Slaughter Act, which again does not cover poultry, even though we slaughter more than 
9 billion birds a year for food. When public concern about intensive confinement agriculture 
began to emerge in the US, this concern was primarily directed toward mammals – cows, calves 
raised for veal, and pigs. It was only when this movement continued to grow that the public began 
to focus on poultry. The way in which egg-laying hens are kept in battery cages is arguably one of 
the worst, if not the worst, of many inhumane methods used in modern agriculture. Traditionally, 
95% of egg-laying hens were maintained in small wire cages, with as many as six to a cage. Each 
animal therefore had less space (67-86 square inches is the official recommendation of United 
Egg Producers) than that occupied by a sheet of typing paper, and in common situations which I 
have observed, chickens live on top of other chickens. 
 Broiler chickens – i.e., animals raised for meat – who 50 years ago took 42 weeks to reach 
market weight, now do so in seven weeks. Their legs do not develop commensurately, and by the 
time they go to market, their ability to stand is seriously compromised. I recall in the 1980s, when 
I began to work on farm animal welfare issues, some normally intelligent citizens asking me if 
chickens were animals. And some of my PhD colleagues from Columbia University informed me 
with pride that for reasons of animal welfare, they purchased Perdue chickens, a company which 
for 15 years ran ads showing chickens happily pecking in a barnyard with other farm animals 
there, with the voiceover asserting that “at Perdue we raise happy chickens.” Needless to say, 
this is blatantly false. 
 Because the Humane Slaughter Act does not cover chickens, slaughter practices are 
horrendous. While serving on the Pew Commission (2008), the first group to do a detailed study 
of industrial confinement agriculture, we visited a chicken slaughterhouse. The animals were hung 
by their feet, heads down, on a conveyor belt. As they approached the killing machine, robotic 
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paddles automatically fitted themselves to their heads, and an electric shock theoretically 
designed to stun them into insensibility was delivered. The animals were then mechanically 
eviscerated and dumped into scalding water. The stunning failed approximately two thirds of the 
time, and is now a major issue in society, with people demanding more effective methods. 
 Happily, as members of society have grown increasingly aware of how animal products 
are raised, societal concern for the treatment of poultry has expanded exponentially. Many food 
and restaurant companies have demanded an end to battery cages, and “free-range egg 
production” is a growth industry in the US, Europe, Australia and New Zealand. Awareness of 
many of the atrocities detailed above, including slaughter, have reached the social mind, and 
people are willing to spend more money in support of a decent life for chickens.  
 I fully agree with Marino’s claim that societal apathy regarding chickens is partially a 
function of commodification of these animals. Furthermore, whereas most of us have had 
encounters with dogs, cats, and horses, relatively few of us have ever seen a live chicken, let alone 
interacted with one. I confess to personally having had a similar cavalier attitude about chickens 
until I acquired a flock of them when we purchased a rural property. It did not take me long to 
learn that these animals would get to know you, bond with you, greet you and show many signs 
of affection and attention. In the face of all this, I soon grew very attached to them, particularly 
one little red hen. Although we kept the chickens in a fairly tall fenced enclosure at night to 
protect them from predation, coyotes managed to get into the enclosure and killed a number of 
them, including my red hen. I grieve for her, and still feel, almost 40 years later, a strong measure 
of regret that I failed to protect her. 
 In fact, anyone who has kept chickens around the house and spends time with them will 
bond with them and detect in them many of the traits that one finds in other companion animals. 
What Lori Marino has done in this excellent paper is to provide a solid scientific basis for the 
claims that those who live with chickens learn from interacting with them. In other words, instead 
of what one all too often finds, this paper uses empirical data to support common sense and 
common decency, not to oppose it. 
The topics explored by Marino (2017a,b) are definitive, and should work well to lay to rest 
forever the widespread belief that chickens have no personality, are unintelligent, or in any other 
way lack a mental life. She exhaustively explores the studies on cognition in chickens, most of 
which provide strong individual evidence of “thinking chickens,” but collectively they represent a 
virtually indubitable case. The mental modalities studied include visual cognition and spatial 
orientation; recognition of partly and fully occluded objects; numerical abilities; time perception; 
anticipation of the future; episodic memory; self-control (i.e., trading immediate gratification for 
future benefit); the ability to reason and utilize logical inferences (the denial of which is a key 
historical reason for withholding mind from animals, for example by Immanuel Kant and a host of 
other rationalist philosophers); self-awareness; communication and referential communication; 
social complexity; discriminating among individuals in a social group; taking the perspectives of 
others; social learning; the presence of both negative and positive emotions, including fear and 
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Regarding personality, Marino (2017b) remarks:  
 
“the concept of personality is critically important for a complete understand[ing] of animals 
(including humans) as individuals. Instead of viewing other animals as one-dimensional, 
interchangeable units within a species, recognition of personality in other animals allows us to 
accurately see them as complex individuals with multi-dimensional characteristics.” 
 
Marino thinks with utmost clarity and carries this clarity into her writing. This excellent paper is 
highly readable and indeed a pleasure to read. Her moral commitment is made strikingly evident 
in the last paragraph: 
 
“These findings come with a clear recommendation to continue our exploration of chickens’ 
ethological complexity within noninvasive, non-harmful, and more naturalistic contexts. A shift in 
how we ask questions about chicken psychology and behavior will, undoubtedly, lead to even 
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